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REPLY OF PETITIONERS ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
I. INVALIDITY OF THE TRANSFER AND LAW GOVERNING RESTITUTION OF 
THE STATE'S INTEREST IN THE DISPUTED STATE SCHOOL SECTION 
GARFIELD COUNTY'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONS FOR REHEARING dated 
19 October 1993 ["County Response11] purports to address the 
question of remedy for the violation of law adjudicated in this 
matter. That violation of law involved a breach of trust by the 
Division of State Lands and Forestry in executing a deed to 
transfer school trust land to complete a land exchange in which 
the values of the exchanged lands were based on an unlawful 
appraisal recruited by the exchange proponent. This Court held 
that the fundamental trust obligation to ensure receipt of full 
value for school trust lands required, as a matter of law, that 
the values for the exchange be established by an independent 
appraisal obtained by the Division as trustee instead of by the 
proponent of the exchange. 
The specific remaining question posed on rehearing, with 
respect to this aspect of the case, is whether the adjudicated 
violation of law and breach of trust should properly result in 
invalidation of the transfer of the trust property, affirming the 
state's continuing right and interest in the land. 
Petitioner has argued that the remedy in this case should be 
the usual remedy for unlawful action by an administrative agency 
— invalidation of the unlawful action and remand to the agency 
for reconsideration in light of the agency's legal obligations 
and the Court's determinations. Petitioner has also pointed out 
1 
that a remedy invalidating the transfer is essential in order for 
the Division to fulfill its trust obligations (as defined by this 
Court) by taking advantage of the new opportunity for advanta-
geous state-federal land exchanges offered by recent federal 
legislation. 
The County Response, however, purports to argue that 
remedies derived from traditional concepts of trust 
administration call for a different disposition here. Thus, the 
Response claims that traditional remedies for breach of trust do 
not provide for invalidation of the transfer or similar remedy 
affirming the trust's continuing interest in the land.1 
The County is grossly in error in its assertions that 
established remedies for breach of trust do not provide* for 
protection of the trust interest in the disputed land. Indeed, 
none of the cases or authorities cited by the County in any way 
address or deal with the appropriateness of reversing deed 
transactions in order to restore property transferred in breach 
None of the cases or authorities cited by the County in 
any way address or deal with the issue in question. Instead, the 
County Response at 3-4 relies solely on cases that adjudicate 
whether certain transactions by a trustee resulted in a breach. 
The County's assertion that the remedy in those cases depended on 
whether the price was inadequate, Id. at 4-5, 10-11, is both true 
and irrelevant. In the cited cases, the adequacy of value received 
was a central issue in determining whether the trustee's conducted 
constituted a breach of trust. Here, the Court has adjudicated 
existence of the breach of trust based on its sound interpretation 
of the trustee's duty to follow valuation practices that will 
minimize speculation about values. The question here at issue 
concerns the proper remedy for that adjudicated breach. Moreover, 
the County's assertion that in the cited cases "the sales in 
question were not voided" is also equally irrelevant for the simple 
reason that the cases involved actions in which only a damage 
remedy was sought. 
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of trust. Instead, the cases asserted as the basis for the 
County Response (particularly at 3-5, 10-11) address a much 
different question: whether a breach of trust resulted from 
certain transactions by a trustee. For that purpose, it is true 
— but irrelevant to the instant case — that the cited cases 
turned on the adequacy of trustee judgments about the adequacy of 
value received.2 
Here, the Court has already determined that there was a 
breach of trust based on the trustee's duty to obtain an 
independent appraisal in order to ensure reliability of 
transaction values. The remaining question at issue concerns the 
proper remedy for that adjudicated breach. 
Contrary to the County's contentions, fundamental concepts 
of trust law clearly hold that a transferee who receives a 
transfer of land or other trust property in breach of trust holds 
the property subject to the interest of the trust and is subject 
to appropriate orders for restitution. The relevant legal 
questions do not turn on the propriety of a remedy against the 
property (except in circumstances, irrelevant here, involving 
bona fide purchasers in a subsequent transaction). The key 
questions, instead, concern the circumstances in which the 
transferee is properly held to have such notice of the trust 
obligations and/or involvement in the breach of trust as to 
The County's assertion that "the sales in question were not 
voided" in the cited cases is also irrelevant for the simple reason 
that the cited cases involved actions in which only a monetary 
remedy was sought. 
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justify the application of that otherwise clearly-available 
remedy. 
First, concerning the propriety of the remedy for recovery 
of the trust property, the Restatement of the Law, Trusts 2d3 is 
explicit, both in its direct treatment of the issue and in its 
development of refinements which depend upon attribution of 
notice to the transferee. Analysis begins with the proposition 
that where notice of the elements constituting the breach is 
attributed to the transferee, "the transferee does not hold the 
property free of the trust, although he paid value for the 
transfer." Restatement Trusts 2d at § 288, specifically 
explaining further that "the interest of the beneficiary in the 
trust property is not cut off" in these circumstances, and "the 
beneficiary can in equity compel the third person to restore the 
property to the trust." Id. at "Comment a." 
Moreover, the above general principles are made "black-
letter" explicit with regard to a specific right to remedies 
against the property: 
§ 291. Extent of Liability of Transferee with Notice 
(1) Where the trustee in breach of trust transfers 
trust property to a person who takes with notice of the 
breach of trust, the transferee can be compelled, 
(a) if he has not disposed of the property, to restore 
it to the trust, together with the income which he has 
received from the property; . . . . 
3
 These concepts and basic text of Restatement Trusts 2d 
published by the American Law Institute 1959 are maintained and 
remain unqualified in the subsequent Appendix volume for the period 
1959-1986 and current supplement. 
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Restatement Trusts 2d at § 291 (emphasis added). 
Second, then, the key question is whether, given the 
circumstances of the breach of trust at issue here, "notice" of 
that breach of trust can properly be attributed to the 
transferee. Obviously, there is no credible basis on which the 
County could claim lack of notice of the rigorous trust 
obligations under which the land in question was held. Hence, 
the only question here is whether notice of the elements 
constituting the breach of trust is legally attributable to the 
transferee County. 
As discussed infra, the facts about the County's actual 
notice of questions about the validity of the appraisals in this 
case are in themselves sufficient to attribute notice of the 
breach of trust, and certainly to place on the County a duty of 
inquiry. But any question about the propriety of that 
attribution is resolved by the established law summarized in the 
Restatement and its explanatory comments. 
First, given the determination that the instant transaction 
was unlawful, it is doubtful under the law summarized by the 
Restatement that even complete lack of actual notice would be a 
defense: 
§ 290. Transferee in an Illegal Transaction 
If the trustee in breach of trust and as part of an 
illegal transaction transfers trust property to a person who 
knows the circumstances which make the transaction illegal, 
the transferee does not hold the property free of the trust, 
although he had no notice of the trust. 
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* * * 
[Comment] (b) Mistake of law or fact. The rule stated in 
this Section is applicable if the transferee knows the 
circumstances which make the transaction illegal, even 
though he does not know that as a matter of law it is 
illegal. The rule is not applicable, however, unless the 
transferee knows the circumstances which make the 
transaction illegal. 
Restatement Trusts 2d at § 290 and Comment (b). Here, of course, 
there is no question that the County was well aware of all the 
circumstances which this Court found to render the transaction 
unlawful because of failure to obtain a proper appraisal. The 
traditional application of the above trust concepts is to 
transactions traditionally void as a matter of public policy 
(e.g., gambling). See Comment (a). But the strong public 
policy, statutory and constitutional obligations recited by this 
Court as the basis for the trust obligation in this case 
justifies an equally strong presumption that the transferee must 
make restitution of the property to the trust.4 
Even if attribution of notice of the breach of trust should 
be considered necessary in these circumstances, both the 
Restatement and the facts of the case demonstrate satisfaction of 
that requirement, again requiring restitution of the property: 
§ 297. What Constitutes Notice of Breach of Trust 
A person has notice of a breach of trust if 
4
 With respect to remedies, § 290 cross references § 293, 
which in turn invokes § 292. That section of the Restatement is 
explicit: "If he [the transferee] has not disposed of the property 
but still retains it, the beneficiary can charge him as construc-
tive trustee of the property and can compel him to restore it to 
the trust . . . ." Restatement Trusts 2d at § 292, Comment a. 
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(a) he knows or should know of the breach of trust, or 
(b) by statute or otherwise he is subjected to the 
same liabilities as though he knew or should have known of 
the breach of trust, even though in fact he did not know and 
had no reason to know of the breach of trust. 
* * * 
[Comment] (j) Notice of Legal effect of terms of trust. 
When a transferee knows or should know the terms of the 
trust, he is chargeable with notice of the legal effect of 
those terms. Thus, if under the terms of the trust the 
trustee is not empowered to sell the trust property, the 
transferee is chargeable with notice of the lack of power of 
the trustee, even though the transferee was not unreasonable 
in interpreting the trust instrument as conferring a power 
of sale upon the trustee, and even though the transferee so 
interpreted the instrument as the result of advice of 
competent counsel. 
Restatement Trusts 2d at § 297 and explanatory Comment (j). The 
cases cited in support of the above analysis in Restatement 
Trusts 2d Appendix volume at § 297 involve a wide range of 
settings in which the circumstances gave rise to a legal 
obligation on the part of the transferee to inquire into the 
legal basis for the trusteed actions and to correctly assess 
their lawfulness. Error in those assessments charged the 
transferee with notice of the breach of trust and accompanying 
obligations of restitution. 
Under the circumstances of this case, there can be no doubt 
of the County's recognition of the rigorous trust obligations 
governing the actions of the trustee Division of State Lands and 
Forestry. Here the County itself was not only aware of the trust 
obligations, but knew that those obligations were specifically 
applicable to the instant transaction and involved substantial 
duties to seek full value in disposal of trust property. See 
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"Board Memo" dated July 27, 1987, at page three, transmitted to 
Garfield County as enclosure to letter dated August 7, 1987, from 
Patrick D. Spurgin, Director, Division of State Lands & Forestry 
to Tom Hatch, Chairman, Garfield County Commission. Also summar-
ized in Board meeting attended by Chairman Hatch as reflected in 
Minutes of Meeting of Utah Board of State Lands and Forestry 
dated September 11, 1987, at page 21. See Record items 5 and 9 
as listed in letter transmitting administrative record to the 
Court dated March 3, 1988. Both of the above summaries known to 
the County Commission expressly recited the Board's "fiduciary 
duty," specifying that it includes "a duty to seek full value in 
the disposal of trust property" and "a duty of loyalty, i.e., the 
Board must strive to benefit the trust beneficiaries and may not 
have, as it's [sic] purpose, the benefit of a third party .. . ." 
The County's actual notice as well as duty of inquiry was 
unquestionably clear after the Division not only advised the 
County of its concerns about the adequacy of the appraisal 
submitted, but also notified the County that issues raised by 
Petitioner NPCA specifically related to the adequacy of the 
appraisal. 
First, by letter to the Division of October 14, 1987, NPCA 
had filed its requests for "declaratory rulings" which raised 
specific questions about the propriety of appraisals "recruited" 
by the exchange proponent (and were on the public record). See 
Record item 15 as listed in letter transmitting administrative 
record to the Court dated March 3, 1988. NPCA's request 
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specifically invoked statutory requirements of UCA § 65-1-26 
which required appraisal by a "suitable person," and questioned 
"whether it is ever appropriate for the "suitable person" who 
conducts the Division's appraisal to be hired by an interested 
party . . . ." Id. at 5. 
Second, the Division subsequently advised the County that it 
had specific concerns about the adequacy of the appraisal 
supplied by the County's appraiser and, without correction of the 
appraisal, simply proposed that the County proffer additional 
lands to increase the values considered in the exchange. Letter 
to Tom Hatch, Chairman, Garfield County Commission, from Patrick 
D. Spurgin, Director of the Division dated November 3, 1987. See 
Record item 16 listed in letter transmitting administrative 
record to the Court dated March 3, 1988. The same letter advised 
the County of NPCA's requests for declaratory rulings that raised 
the above questions, specifically advising the County that the 
letter raised "issues concerning the propriety of undertaking the 
exchange indicated in Garfield County's original application and 
as modified in accordance with the requirements of this letter" 
(i.e., requiring additional exchange value). Thus, it was 
abundantly clear that the County was put on inquiry concerning 
the adequacy of the appraisal, of the value problems in the 
transaction, and of the availability in the record of NPCA 
specific legal questions concerning the propriety of a proponent-
"recruited" appraisal. 
Thus, both the established law of trust remedies and the 
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facts of this case make clear that the transferee County was 
properly "chargeable with notice of the legal effect" of the 
requirements of the trust. Indeed, that would be so "even though 
the transferee was not unreasonable" in assessing the obligations 
governing the transfer, and even if interpretation of the trust 
requirements was "the result of advice of competent counsel". 
Trusts 2d § 297, comment j, supra. 
Here, the Court has made clear that the strict trust 
obligations protecting school trust lands — well known to the 
County in the course of the challenged transaction — required 
the assurance of an independent appraisal answerable only to the 
trustee, not arranged by the purchaser. The County was not in 
doubt about the extent and rigor of the school trust obligation. 
Indeed, the County argued that obligation as the basis for its 
claim in this litigation that the duty to complete the 
transaction overrode other obligations. Hence, the County's 
knowledge that the trustee had failed to comply with the legal 
obligation to obtain an independent appraisal, and its 
participation in arranging and promoting reliance on the unlawful 
appraisal, are more than sufficient to charge the County with 
notice of the breach of trust. Any doubt about that legal 
conclusion is fully allayed by the facts outlined above, which 
clearly placed the County on inquiry. 
II. ISSUES CONCERNING THE DIVISIONS OBLIGATION TO CONSIDER 
NON-ECONOMIC VALUES 
The County asserts that "it is clear that this Court 
understood the considerations posed by NPCA in the appeal." 
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County Response at 13• It then asserts that the issue ruled on 
concerned "an affirmative duty" to "look for "non-economic" 
options as a priority . . . " County Response at 13. Any 
implication that Petitioner NPCA sought priority of non-economic-
values over trust obligations flies in the face of the extensive 
demonstration at original briefing and in the Petition for 
Rehearing that that was not NPCA's position. NPCA Petition for 
Rehearing at 12-15. 
One further demonstration that the Court may not have 
"understood the considerations posed by NPCA" is indicated in the 
Court's footnote 12, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, at 29f 30 n. 12. The 
Court there addressed NPCA's contention that the Division had 
failed to give any substantive consideration to protective 
management of the disputed state section, disregarding any 
obligation to consider applicable standards arising from the 
federal legislation protecting national parks. Brief for 
Petitioner at 34, 35-37; Reply Brief for Petitioner at 17-20. 
The Court's footnote suggests that the cited cases do not 
establish the cited proposition — i.e., "that federal 
legislation protecting national parks extends beyond federal 
boundaries to state inholdings." 
In asserting that those cases are "distinguishable," the 
footnote, in fact, suggests that the Court may not have 
understood both the argument and the cases cited. The argument 
is misunderstood because it asserted only that the federal 
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statutes and their interpretation give rise to a duty of 
consideration of the park values, and that the Division at least 
bore a duty to consider their protection, which was ignored by 
the Division. Brief for Petitioner at 34. Further, the Court 
may not have understood how the cases support that argument, 
because the footnote suggests that the cases were not 
authoritative on the question of applicability of park 
legislation to state "inholdings" within parks, reciting that "in 
both cases the states had ceded jurisdiction to the federal 
government." 215 Utah Adv.Rep at 3 0 n.12. 
That assertion reflects a misunderstanding of the cited 
cases. United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1977) is 
utterly explicit in offering alternative rulings because of some 
uncertainty about the state cession of jurisdiction. Thus Brown 
explicitly held that even if the state had not ceded 
jurisdiction, the park protection statutes nonetheless protected 
the park against activities authorized by the state on state 
inholdings. 552 F.2d at 822. See also Minnesota v. Block, 660 
F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981) at 1248-49 (discussing Brown as the 
basis for an identical holding without any question of state 
cession of jurisdiction). Similarly, while the state in Free 
Enterprise Canoe Renters Ass'n v. Watt had ceded concurrent 
jurisdiction over inheld lands to the United States, 711 F.2d 
852, at 854 (8th Cir. 1983), the Court specifically addressed the 
question of federal authority to exercise regulatory authority 
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over activities on "nonfederal public roads," specifically 
upholding National Park Service regulatory authority to "exceed 
federal boundaries when necessary" in light of "the recognized 
federal power to regulate nonfederal land" pursuant to the Pro-
perty Clause, U.S. Const, art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 711 F.2d at 856. 
Thus, contrary to the County's assertion that "it is clear 
that this Court understood the considerations posed by NPCA, 
County Response at 13, there is reason to believe those 
contentions were not fully understood. Thus, NPCA did not claim 
for purposes of this case that the extra-park reach of the cited 
federal legislation overrode trust duties. The legislation and 
implementing cases were cited, rather, to demonstrate the 
existence of a duty by the Board and Division to take steps 
seeking protection consistent with trust duties. The claim was 
that the record showed those agencies had entirely disregarded — 
made no effort to fulfill — that duty, despite the usual legal 
duty of administrative agencies to address regally-relevant 
factors. That claim was not addressed by the Court's opinion. 
DATED: November 1, 1993. 
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